Why The Controversy on India’s Defence Theatre Commands Is a Tale of Misplaced Context & Wayward Interpretation

 Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, responding to a question during a television interview on 2 June about the reservations of IAF on re-apportioning of its limited assets into the theatre commands, stated, “... the IAF continues to remain a supporting arm, just as artillery support or engineers support the combatant arm in the army.”

Speaking at the same event later, Indian Air Force Chief Air Marshal- RKS Bhadauria said- “It is not a supporting role alone. The airpower has a huge role to play. In any of the integrated battle areas, it’s not an issue of support alone.”

On the first look, it does seem like a counter to CDS General’s comment. However, this soon gained media attention with reports of a bitter turf war between the Indian Army and Air Force Chiefs. In fact, there were also mentions of Army and Navy being on one page in the ‘theaterisation’ process while Air Force being side-lined.

However, a deep dive into the matter shows that it was dramatized by misinterpreting the original statement by CDS General and taking them out of context.

Let’s Start from The Beginning

The root of the clash lies in an ongoing transformational military process being devised by the Indian government — the administrative and operational amalgamation of the three services into integrated commands, whereby the army, the navy and the air force would function in synchrony, indifferent, geographically well-defined theatres of activity, under one hat, to achieve specified political objectives- otherwise known as ‘theaterisation’.

The structural framework for India’s Theatre Command system with the terrain and strategic threats being prime factors. Larger theatre structures facilitate flexible cooperation in greater quantities of military power and concurrent with inter-service integration would cater for centralised joint planning and decentralised application of military power. These aspects shape the structure of the four Theatre Commands proposed. The Northern Theatre Command will be responsible for the land border with China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, the Western Theatre Command for the Pakistan border, the South Western Theatre Command and the South Eastern Command for the Western part and Eastern part of the Indian Ocean. All Theatres would also be responsible for the hinterland areas based on state boundaries.

The existing Chiefs of Staff Committee would be renamed as Joint Commanders and Staff Committee (JCSC) comprising the Chairman-Joint Commanders and Staff Committee (CJCSC), three Chiefs and four Theatre Commanders. The JCSC will formulate a military strategy. The operational directives to the Theatre Commands will emanate from JCSC. The Joint Operational staff (JOS) consisting of Component Commanders in the HQ IDS will task the Theatre Commands and provide resources, as required for better coordination between the political leadership and civilian bureaucracy.

Geography and Threat

Geography and threats are two key factors that must be given centre stage in the conceptual framework for restructuring. At a fundamental level, the main challenge for the Indian military is to strike a balance for military power between India’s continental and maritime space through a framework of cooperative flexibility accommodated within the largest structures feasible.

Primary threats to India are from China and Pakistan, with the potential threat from China being greater. There is also a possibility of a combined threat from a Sino-Pak nexus. China’s threat can manifest in the Continental domain, mostly through our Northern borders and maritime space that includes the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Threats will also manifest through the domains of cyber and space. However, the strategic value of these threats lies in acting as a layer on the physical spaces on earth – air, sea, and land.

ITC is an integrated force that is assigned a specific geographical theatre and can operate independently. Conceptually, the theatre should be as large as possible to allow cooperative flexibility in large numbers. Integrated Theatre Commanders will be responsible for operational planning and tactical execution of all warfighting within the theatre based on operational directives. The Indian Ocean and our commitments in the Indo-Pacific lend themselves to a single theatre which, due to reasons of threats from two nations, could have two Maritime Commands located in the East and West and largely conform to the existing area of responsibility of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command. These two commands could be part of a single Maritime Theatre Command. But two factors work against singularity.

First – the maritime vision is one of expanding capabilities to the waters beyond the Indian Ocean, and that would make a single maritime theatre unwieldy.

Second, the permeability of external and internal threats demands that Theatre Commands share the internal continental space. The internal space that one maritime-based theatre would have to share is sizeable and evident from the map above. Therefore, the two existing Western and Eastern Naval Command are re-designated as South Western Theatre Command (SWTC) and South Eastern Theatre Command (SETC). Each would be based on fleets, Area Headquarters of the Army and Operational Groups of the IAF and have tri-service Component Commanders with assets allotted by the HQ IDS.